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Context: Clinical reasoning plays a major role in the ability of doctors to make diagnoses and decisions. It is
considered as the physician’s most critical competence, and has been widely studied by physicians,
educationalists, psychologists and sociologists. Since the 1970s, many theories about clinical reasoning in
medicine have been put forward.
Purpose: This paper aims at exploring a comprehensive approach: the ‘‘dual-process theory’’, a model
developed by cognitive psychologists over the last few years.
Discussion: After 40 years of sometimes contradictory studies on clinical reasoning, the dual-process theory
gives us many answers on how doctors think while making diagnoses and decisions. It highlights the
importance of physicians’ intuition and the high level of interaction between analytical and non-analytical
processes. However, it has not received much attention in the medical education literature. The implications of
dual-process models of reasoning in terms of medical education will be discussed.
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Background
C
linical reasoning refers to ‘the cognitive process
that is necessary to evaluate and manage a
patient’s medical problem’ (1). It allows physi-
cians to make diagnoses and decisions (e.g. laboratory
tests and drug prescriptions), and is considered as one of
the major determining factors of clinical competence (2).
Many researchers  including health professionals, edu-
cation specialists, cognitive psychologists and sociologists
 have therefore invested this field of medical practice and
education for nearly 40 years. Their work has helped
many to understand clinical reasoning as an idiosyn-
cratic, multifaceted and highly complex skill, character-
ized by different processes that mobilize specific
knowledge held in long-term memory (3, 4). However,
many researchers still have diverging opinions on how
doctors think while making diagnoses and decisions,
particularly on the place of intuition in the reasoning
process and its interactions with analytic thinking.
This article aims at casting a comprehensive view on
clinical reasoning, through a model developed over the
past 15 years: the dual-process theory. This model of
reasoning has been previously described in the cognitive
psychology literature, but remains uncommonly used in
the medical education literature. Our aim is to provide
a review of the major works done over recent years on
the dual-process theory, in order to make this approach
more available to clinical teachers and medical educa-
tors. First we take a look at a description of this
contemporary theory, in the context of reasoning in
general. We then describe how it relates to the models
of reasoning that have been identified in the field
of medicine. Finally, we discuss the implications of
this approach for medical education and define new
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Discussion
Dual-process theory: an emerging model
Dual-process theory stemmed largely from work done in
the mid-1990s in the field of cognitive psychology,
particularly by Epstein and Hammond (5, 6).
Two separate systems
According to this approach, two cognitive systems are
used to reason.
 The first, described as ‘intuitive’, ‘tacit’ and also
‘experiential’, is a reflex system whose trigger occurs
in automated mode (5, 7). It produces an intuitive
response, which means that it is generated without
effort and is below the threshold of perceptible
consciousness (8). The intuitive system is therefore
particularly rapid (9). It uses information which is
readily available, in particular visual, and operates on
the principle of recognition of a typical configuration
of signs, or of similarities with previously encountered
similar situations. The approach of the clinician is at
once partial (only part of the available information is
processed), holistic (the individual will make an over-
all assessment of the situation) and approximate (7).
The response that is generated intuitively is highly
dependent on contextual cues, as we will see later (10).
In addition, the affective state of the individual is an
important determinant of intuitive reasoning (911).
In the medical literature, intuition has been compared
to ‘gut feelings’ by some authors (12, 13).
 The second system is described as ‘analytical’, ‘delib-
erate’ and ‘rational’ (5, 7). It comes from a rational
and deliberate judgement based on additional infor-
mation collected actively by the individual in his or her
environment and the conscious application of rules
that have been acquired through learning (911, 14).
Kahneman (9) speaks of a ‘rule-governed’system. It is
therefore rather slow and very demanding for cogni-
tion (11).
The place of intuition in the reasoning process
Bargh and Chartrand (15) state that the majority of our
decisions and actions are the result of automated reason-
ing. In the same vein, Kahneman (9) considers that in our
daily life it is the most common path of decision-making.
According to other authors, such as Epstein (5),
Hogarth (7, 8) and Hammond (6), the two systems
are jointly involved in most of our cognitive activities.
Depending on the situation, the individual would
rather use the intuitive system or the analytical system.
Situations in which the valence goes towards one system
or another remain unclear. Preliminary conclusions from
recent publications in the medical literature tend to show
that the valence goes towards the analytical system in the
following situations (14, 16):
 when time permits
 when there are high-stake outcomes
 when the situation is complex
 when the decision-maker is facing ambiguous, non-
routine or ill-defined problems  Scho ¨n speaks of
‘‘unstructured and indeterminate zones of practice’’
(16)
 in the context of uncertainty.
In contrast, routine problems associated with a higher
level of certainty would be more often dealt with by the
intuitive system, especially when time is lacking.
From a functional point of view, in the hypothesis that
both systems are jointly involved in most of our decisions,
reasoning always starts intuitively, which means that
environmental information is interpreted preconsciously
at first (8). The intuitive system is activated unconsciously
and automatically (7, 8). As a general rule, the result of
this automated processing will give rise in the working
memory to the genesis of one or more possible solutions.
Prompting the analytical system will then allow con-
firmation or invalidation of the relevance of these (8).
However, in some situations actions can be undertaken
automatically and thus can come before the understand-
ing the subject has of the situation, in order to allow a
prompt intervention (8, 15).
The monitoring function of the analytical system over the
intuitive system
Kahneman and Klein (17) reviewed some experiments
showing that individuals often adopt the intuitive re-
sponse without checking it. They give priority to rapidly
generated solutions rather than deep analytic thinking.
Yet, theoretically, the analytical system plays a monitor-
ing role over the intuitive response. It can consciously
overrule the intuitive process in situations where a
conflict in believability or validity is detected (9, 16). So
to speak, during the reasoning process the intuitive
response could be associated in these situations with a
kind of ‘sense of alarm’  using an expression borrowed
from Stolper et al. (12)  i.e., the decision-maker would
consider that something is going wrong.
This controlling function may be ineffective in two
situations.
 When the level of vigilance of the individual (through
his or her analytical system) is lowered by contextual
factors such as lackof time, concurrent involvement in
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inattentiveness or distraction (911, 18). Psycho-affec-
tive factors such as overconfidence, self-deception,
disillusionment, complacency and lack of motivation
can also lead to the diminution of the level of vigilance
of the analytical system (14, 16, 19, 20).
 When the analytical system is purely inhibited by the
intuitive system (10). This phenomenon was described
for the first time by Stanovich in the 1990s (14). The
author speaks of ‘dysrationalia’ when pointing out the
inability of individuals to think and behave rationally
in the absence of intellectual deficiency (14).
Clinical reasoning in the framework of the dual-
process theory
In the framework of the dual-process theory, pattern
recognition and hypothetico-deduction  which have been
extensively described in the medical literature  are the
basis of the intuitive system and the analytical system,
respectively (3).
Pattern recognition and hypothetico-deduction
Pattern recognition is the most common form of non-
analytical processes. It consists of unconsciously making
a link between a given clinical situation and patterns
stored in the long-term memory, through the automated
identification and treatment of clinical and contextual
information. It allows clinicians to formulate diagnostic
hypotheses very fast when encountering a patient for the
first time (21, 22). In Barrows and Tamblyn’s (1) multiple-
step model of clinical reasoning, this process corresponds
to step 1  where the physicians perceives ‘instantly and
almost unconsciously’ contextual and clinical cues from
his environment  and step 2, where hypotheses are
generated on the basis of past experiences with patients,
through an ‘unconscious act of memory association’.I t
has been shown that pattern recognition is widely used by
clinicians, regardless of their degree of expertise (2325).
In the framework of the dual-process theory, pattern
recognition corresponds to prompting the intuitive sys-
tem (3, 9, 13, 23).
Hypothetico-deduction is a process in which diagnostic
hypotheses are tested analytically (by questioning the
patient, making a clinical examination, etc.) in order to
confirm or invalidate solutions that have been generated
non-analytically (2). In Barrows and Tamblyn’s (1) model
it corresponds to step 3, which consists of strengthening
or ruling out the initial hypotheses. The use of hypothe-
tico-deduction by physicians was shown early by Elstein,
Shulman and Sprafka (26). Later, it was extensively
demonstrated that both experts and novices use this
reasoning process, which is considered a very common
and general form of clinical reasoning (3, 23, 27).
In the framework of the dual-process theory, hypothe-
tico-deduction corresponds to prompting the analytical
system (3). Other forms of analytical thinking have been
described in the medical literature, in particular ‘forward
reasoning’, i.e., starting the reasoning process from the
data to generate subsequently diagnostic hypotheses
through a rule-governed approach (28, 29). This process
is probably used by physicians when the intuitive system
is unable to generate early relevant solutions to complex
or rare problems. In these situations, clinicians may also
have conscious recourse to their pathophysiological
knowledge (29).
Further investigations are needed to show if physicians
actually work within the frame of dual-process models of
reasoning. Recently published papers highlight the re-
levance of this theory in the fields of anesthesia,
emergency medicine and general practice (14, 30, 31).
Balla et al. (31) specifically looked at the congruence of
general practitioners’ (GPs) reasoning and the dual-
process models. The authors showed that GPs first
automatically make a rapid framing of the problem to
generate early hypotheses, based on salient features of the
clinical picture. These latter are recognized thanks to
previous experience and theoretical knowledge. This
corresponds to prompting the intuitive system. After-
wards, GPs will deliberately test these hypotheses,
through active collection of further information, until a
decision threshold is reached. This is consistent with the
functioning of the analytical system.
The place of intuition and analytical thinking in the clinical
reasoning process, and the interactions between the two
systems
It has been widely accepted for over a decade that the
analytical and non-analytical processes identified within
the scope of clinical reasoning research are not mutually
exclusive (3234). Thus, according to Eva (35), ‘It is
highly probable that both forms of processing contribute
to the final decisions reached in all cases (for both novices
and experts)’. Indeed, experimental studies show in both
novice and expert physicians that using purely analytical
or purely non-analytical strategies leads to lower diag-
nostic performance than when subjects are asked to use a
combination of both processes (3638).
In most situations, pattern recognition allows clinicians
to formulate diagnostic assumptions and management
options intuitively and rapidly; these will be confirmed or
ruled out analytically through a hypothetico-deductive
process. Neufeld et al.’s (24) findings highlight the
importance of intuition in the clinical reasoning process:
when a correct hypothesis is considered in the first five
minutes, there is a 95 per cent chance of reaching the
correct diagnosis. Failing this, there is an identical
probability of being mistaken. In the same vein, early
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the final diagnosis (26).
The benefits of considering clinical reasoning through the
framework of the dual-process theory
Although many grey areas remain, the dual-process
model of reasoning is a very relevant and promising
approach, in the context of both education and research.
 One major interest is to highlight and strengthen the
plurality of the processes involved in clinical reason-
ing. Indeed, much work in the field of medical
education has led to the partitioning of analytical
and non-analytical processes. Preliminary research
done in the framework of the dual-process model
allows a better understanding of the interactions
between the intuitive and analytical systems.
 The dual-process theory also highlights the fact that,
to varying degrees, intuition is constantly involved in
reasoning. This is a very important feature, since for
centuries professional intuition has been considered in
medicine as a ‘mysterious’skill that is not accessible to
consciousness and should not prevail over rational
and scientific judgement. Highlighting the importance
of intuition in medical expertise is associated with
many important educational issues, as we will see.
 This approach also stresses the importance of con-
textual factors in the clinical reasoning process.
According to Gruppen and Frohna (22), ‘a growing
body of research outside of medicine demonstrates
that problem solving in real-world settings typically
places a heavy reliance on the environment, both to
support problems solving activities and to modify the
problem solving process to fit the demands and
constraints of the situation’. Some researchers even
consider that context is one of the main constraints on
reasoning in the healthcare setting (10).
 Finally, the dual-process approach allows researchers
and medical educators to cast a new light on
diagnostic errors.
Is intuition reliable?
A sticking point in the research community
Researchers disagree about the reliability of intuition.
Some consider that although the intuitive system is much
of the time effective, it is more vulnerable to errors than
the analytical system, because of the contextual and
affective factors that could affect its functioning (10, 11,
14). In contrast, other published works in the psychology
literature provide evidence that inducements to the
analytical system can lead to a poorer level of perfor-
mance, because of the considerable cognitive resources
that are needed to perform analytically (37).
As to theorists of the dual-process models of reason-
ing, they consider that, contrary to a common premise,
the responses generated by the analytical system are not
better than those from the intuitive system (8, 23). A
recent review by Norman and Eva (37) underpins the fact
that both systems are equally prone to errors. In the same
vein, research carried out in the field of medicine has
shown that pattern recognition strategies often lead to
decisions that are identical to those obtained analytically
(39). A holistic assessment of the situation may some-
times be even more relevant (40) in areas where visual
information is dominant (36) as well as in other areas of
medicine (23).
In regard to the theoretical framework offered by dual-
process models of reasoning, we believe that these
diverging opinions and research results could be partly
due to the fact that it seems difficult to incriminate solely
the intuitive or the analytical system when errors are
made, given the high level of complementarity and
interaction between both systems during the reasoning
process. We could indeed consider that erroneous in-
tuitive responses are as much the result of faulty intuitive
judgement as they are the consequence of a dysfunction
of the analytical system through its controlling role.
Errors made during the analytical process could as well
be the result of the dysfunction of the analytical system as
the consequence of the inability of the intuitive system to
generate early and relevant diagnostic hypotheses.
In order to deepen the question of the reliability of
intuition, we will consider further the factors behind its
effectiveness and possible bias. The work carried out
within the scope of the dual-process theory allows us to
consider a number of assumptions on this topic. We now
discuss the importance of the affective state of the
individual on his or her intuitive response, and also
consider the nature of the information used by the
intuitive system. Finally, we focus on the working
environment in which clinicians’ intuition is developed,
considering the feedback given to these professionals in
their practice.
The affective valence of intuitive judgements
As highlighted at the beginning of this article, the
intuitive system is particularly sensitive to the affective
state of the individual (8). For this reason, it is unrealistic
to consider that clinical reasoning can only rely on
objective judgements that are devoid of emotions (41).
Little work has been carried out on the affective
component of clinical reasoning (41). However, there are
sufficient arguments to suggest that the reliability of
intuitive responses is largely influenced by the feelings of
physicians towards their patients. A negative feeling
could, for example, occur when facing an individual
with morbid obesity, a history of drug abuse or
psychiatric behavioural disorders. Labelling patients as
‘plaintive’, ‘difficult’, ‘manipulative’ or ‘borderline per-
sonality’ is also likely to influence reasoning (41).
Thierry Pelaccia et al.
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a physician towards his or her patients as ‘preconscious
affective dispositions’.
The discussion about the affective valence of reasoning
brings us to the notion of emotional intelligence, which is
defined as ‘The ability to monitor one’s own and others’
feelings, to discriminate among them, and to use this
information to guide one’s thinking and action’ (42).
Much has been written about this topic. To gain
emotional intelligence, Hogarth (43) considers that
‘‘people should be aware that the information transmitted
by their emotions is just part of the data that should be
considered’’.
According to Croskerry, Abbas and Albert (41), ‘The
idea of affective influence on decision making will be
unfamiliar to many clinicians... There is a growing
imperative for medical educators to understand and
incorporate this knowledge into clinical training.’
Although we fully agree with these authors about the
need to consider the affective valence of clinical reasoning
in the context of medical education, the ‘teachability’ of
emotional intelligence remains uncertain. A recent review
by Norman (44) highlights the ‘loose definition of
emotional intelligence’. The author considers that its
value has not been demonstrated in the field of health
sciences education. In this context, it seems difficult to
introduce any reliable educational recommendations in
relation to emotional intelligence.
The nature of the information used by the intuitive system
Experts process information differently from novices. In
their field of expertise, they can intuitively use a larger
quantity of information (8). Paradoxically, some authors
consider that very often the number of cues used in
cognitive tasks intended to judge similarity is limited (45).
More than quantity, it seems that the relevance of the cues
may be a significant determinant of the efficacy of the
intuitive reasoning process. Indeed, irrelevant informa-
tion  in particular contextual (e.g., being a banker)  is
likely to be involved in pattern recognition and could lead
to diagnostic errors (46). The same is true for the under-
orover-appreciation of contextual cues (10). In relation to
our previous discussion on the affective valence of
reasoning, we must also highlight the fact that physicians
sometimes use ‘‘distracting cues’’ (such as gender, age,
race, obesity and psychiatric illness) that could be
inappropriate to make diagnoses and decisions (10).
The feedback given to clinicians
It is particularly important to take account of the
environment in which intuition is acquired, and more
particularly the feedback provided by this environment.
In this regard, Hogarth (7) distinguishes between ‘kind’
and ‘wicked’ environments. The first are determined by
the fact that the individual gets immediate, appropriate
and unambiguous feedback. These environments lead to
the appropriate development of intuition. Wicked envir-
onments are places in which feedback is inconsistent, late
and sometimes inadequate  for instance, it is not directly
attributable to the individual’s actions. Broadly speaking,
the working environment of clinicians is rather wicked.
Indeed, feedback  comparing patient outcomes with
diagnoses and decisions made by the physician  is often
late and sometimes lacking in clinical practice. Moreover,
the outcomes are not always directly attributable to the
clinicians’ actions: chance, luck, misfortune, bad com-
pliance with treatments and other factors may be
implicated in the evolution of the patient’s health status.
The fact that physicians work in environments that are
not naturally conducive to the development of their
intuition could explain what we call ‘the paradox of
experience’.
The paradox of experience
Although experience is often considered as a reliable
indicator of physicians’ expertise, many researchers state
that experience is not necessarily synonymous with
expertise (16, 20). Several studies underpin this assess-
ment, in many fields of medicine (20, 47, 48). They show
that the physicians’ level of performance in daily clinical
tasks is not constantly correlated with their level of
experience.
In regard to our previous discussion, the dual-process
theory provides a comprehensive framework to under-
stand ‘the paradox of experience’: in some situations,
experienced physicians show poorer performance than
their less experienced peers. In other words, if we consider
that experience  through the feedback offered by clinical
practice  is the ground for development of the intuitive
response, experience may sometimes lead to faulty
intuitions.
Consequences of the dual-process models of
reasoning for medical education
Although further studies are needed to understand
clinical reasoning better through the framework of the
dual-process theory, a number of educational recommen-
dations based on this approach can already be formu-
lated.
The teaching of clinical reasoning in the medical
curriculum
We must recognize that the academic environment of
medical students hardly promotes the active development
of clinical reasoning (5). Indeed, although medical
educators share the view of clinical reasoning as a major
determinant of physicians’ expertise, it is not often an
explicit educational objective in medical universities (14).
Thus the development of clinical reasoning abilities will
most often remain secondary in comparison with knowl-
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that this competence will be gained gradually and
naturally over time, through clinical experience. Other
teachers may believe that reasoning relies on personality
traits that will hardly be gained during medical studies if
they are not already present at entry to medical school
(50).
Kassirer (51) severely criticizes the way clinical reason-
ing is taught in medical schools. He considers that
‘despite substantial advances in our understanding of
human cognition during the last few decades, our
teaching methods are still based largely on expert
opinion’. There is a consensus among experts that clinical
reasoning can and must be taught during medical studies
(52, 53).
Given that one of the main interests of the dual-process
theory is to stress the importance of intuition in the
reasoning process, we will discuss further the conditions
for the active development of intuition through medical
education. We mainly consider the context of bedside
teaching during clinical clerkships, which remains one of
the most relevant places to learn clinical reasoning (54).
Exposure to the targeted skills area
According to Hogarth (7), ‘What we learn is a function of
the opportunities offered by the environments in which
we live and act’ and ‘we cannot learn from something
that we cannot see’. It is therefore desirable to confront
the individual at first with situations in which his or her
intuition is likely to grow, given the area of skills targeted.
For medical students these are courses in healthcare
settings, which in this context establish a major interest
when introduced early in the curriculum. However, some
authors consider that students should first acquire a basis
of biomedical and clinical knowledge, in order to be more
confident and efficient when meeting patients for the first
time (55). This does not mean that learning clinical
reasoning should start with clinical practice; indeed, like
many researchers, Ryan and Higgs (56) argue that the
medical curriculum should ‘infuse clinical reasoning
principles throughout the entire programme’.
In an academic setting, using problem-based learning
is likely to encourage the development of intuition, since
this learning is consistently held in a given field as the
individual is exposed to this field (43). However, this is
not always effective, since the feedback provided to
students is determinant in these learning situations.
Exposure to multiple and varied clinical cases
Exposure to multiple and varied clinical cases will allow
the development of medical students’ intuition through
the construction of patterns in their long-term memory.
Patterns are built on the basis of the transformation and
abstraction of real clinical situations that lead to the
representation of a disease in its most typical form (57).
In this regard, Sanson-Fisher, Rolfe and Williams (55)
consider that ‘it is not adequate to see just one patient
with that condition, as there can be considerable varia-
bility in patient presentations. Instead, students need
multiple experiences with the same type of patient before
that clinical condition can be understood.’ In order to
organize long-term memory knowledge in an efficient
way for reasoning, students should first be confronted
with typical presentations of a given disease, before
managing uncommon presentations (57, 58).
Looking for feedback
Medical students should be encouraged to look actively
for immediate feedback from their tutors, based on a
verbal appraisal of their work. The role of feedback is
critical in the development of students’ reasoning (51, 54,
55, 58, 59), in particular when it allows teachers to point
out errors immediately and discuss them with the learner
(51). Lajoie (60) considers that feedback is also an
effective tool for the development of expertise, which
she describes as ‘dynamic assessment’, as the feedback is
delivered during the activity. This improves the develop-
ment of intuition in the context of problem solving. In the
same vein, Gruppen and Frohna (22) consider that third-
party intervention is particularly useful in order to
develop the ability to reason intuitively.
It is unusual for students to ask for feedback (when not
spontaneously provided by the tutor). Fear of criticism,
fear of being judged negatively, lack of motivation and
lack of time are plausible explanations for this.
Students’ intuition exploration
So that feedback provided by tutors can focus on
students’ intuitive reasoning, students should be encour-
aged to let the tutors know about their intuition during
the management of a patient. On-the-ground training
practice in courses often runs contrary to this, as the
usual guidance given to students is to collect the entire
history of the disease and carry out an exhaustive
systematic clinical examination before formulating diag-
nostic assumptions and suggesting therapeutic solutions.
This way of proceeding means that it is mainly the
analytical part of the reasoning process that is explored
during the debriefing. Although common, this approach
was considered ‘illogical’ by some early researchers (1).
Norman et al. (36) later experimentally confirmed that it
is inappropriate. Moreover, it leads to a lower level of
performance.
As a consequence, in order to explore and use intuitive
reasoning in the perspective of its effective development,
students should have the opportunity to formulate
diagnostic hypotheses from the first seconds or minutes
of encountering the patient. The traditional question,
‘What do you think about this patient?’, should be raised
very early  all the more as many clinicians are unaware
Thierry Pelaccia et al.
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strictly speaking encourage intuitive thinking  as in-
tuitive responses will in any case arise, according to the
dual-process theory  but will allow students and tutors
to discuss the origins of the hypotheses that arise from
intuition.
Inthiscontext,directsupervisionwheretutorsdirectly
observe students during the clinical task is useful (54). It
allows teachers to raise questions during the patient
encounter, in order to explore the learner’s intuition and
observe whether or not he performs a targeted clinical
examination in relation to the intuitive assumptions.
Direct supervision allows clinical teachers to point out
what the learner really did and not just what he says about
his actions. Moreover, this pedagogical approach is
particularly appreciated by medical students (61).
The characteristics of effective feedback
The quality of feedback offered in the context of clinical
education is of major importance for the development of
intuition. Tutors should encourage learners to identify
the information used to reach the intuitive assumptions
formulated from the first seconds or minutes of the
patient encounter, using questions such as ‘What makes
you say that?’ This will lead to awareness of a sponta-
neous automated reasoning (7) and identification of
contextual and clinical cues that have been used during
the clinical reasoning process. The assessment of their
relevance will give useful information about errors due,
for instance, to the inappropriate use or overemphasis of
some cues. In the case of faulty assumptions, students
should be encouraged to look for information that would
refute the diagnosis proposed and discuss alternatives.
This may be complex, since ‘people resist changing the
mental path in which they are already embarked’; they
‘‘like their ideas and are reluctant to change them’’ (7).
The approach is not always natural. Third-party inter-
vention is likely to encourage this practice, which, when
repeated, will become less difficult for the students to
implement and may be underpinned by intuitive pro-
cesses (7). This will allow students to develop skills to
observe and extract relevant information from their
surroundings, in order to think intuitively in similar
situations (7).
Summary
Dual-process theory is a model of reasoning that
integrates the major processes that have been identified
since the 1970s in the field of clinical reasoning research.
It allows us to understand better how doctors think in
their everyday practice. It highlights the considerable
importance of intuition, which plays a determinant role
in most decisions.
Although many grey areas remain, we believe that the
dual-process theory provides a very comprehensive and
useful view of clinical reasoning to medical educators.
These latter should consider the importance of providing
learning environments in which medical students can
develop their abilities to reason intuitively, notably
through giving appropriate feedback.
Dual-process theory gives voice to multiple research
themes that are still largely unexplored. These relate in
particular to the influence of intuition and emotions on
clinical practice, the understanding of diagnostic errors in
the framework of this theory, the integration  in the
academic training of medical students  of settings and
devices which are designed to teach them how to reason
intuitively, the role of tutorial feedback in the develop-
ment of intuition, and the importance of metacognitive
control for reasoning and learning to reason. It also
invites us to undertake further research to (re)consider
the definition of ‘expertise’. Are experts those physicians
who think intuitively  and therefore very rapidly  much
of the time, because they possess many patterns in their
long-term memory, based on a long clinical experience?
Are experts those who are able to monitor their intuition
constantly and reduce errors thanks to their analytical
system, whatever the context and their affective state? Are
experts those who can transition appropriately between
the two modes of thinking, and make a distinction
between routine cases and novel, unusual or ambiguous
situations? Dual-process theory undoubtedly provides a
very challenging framework to understand expertise
better.
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